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INTRODUCTION
In many cases, if not most, voluntary judicial recusal is both an
efficient use of judicial resources and an exceptional safeguard to the
legitimacy of the federal judiciary.1 However, voluntary judicial
recusal poses its own unique problems when the withdrawing judge
declines to issue a statement explaining the statutory grounds for his
or her recusal. Unlike when a party seeks to disqualify a judge by
motion-where the reasons for recusal will, at a minimum, be set out
in the motion papers-when a judge voluntarily recuses, there is not
necessarily any record created as to the reasons for the recusal.2
Such recusals leave litigants in the dark, creating numerous practical
problems where the recusal itself has collateral consequences. These
problems are compounded when, prior to recusal, the judge has
already taken meaningful action in the case.
This article will analyze the recent case of Comer v. Murphy Oil
USA Inc. in an effort to illustrate several of the many reasons why
federal judges, upon voluntary recusal, should be required to issue a
statement identifying the statutory provision requiring their
disqualification. The article will also argue that where a judge is
recusing him or herself from a case where the basis of the recusal
may be waived, the parties should be permitted to demand, and
receive, a statement sufficiently detailed so as to permit them to
waive the conflict if they so choose.
1 Bruce A. Green, Fear of the Unknown: Judicial Ethics After Caperton, 60
SYRACUSE L. REV. 229, 234 (2010) (stating that voluntary recusal "promote[s]
judicial economy [and] minimize[s] public scrutiny and criticism" of courts). This
article is limited to recusal issues involving the federal judiciary because the
federal system has one unified standard; the federal statutes or language similar to
that found in those statutes have been adopted by several states; and the illustrating
case, Comer v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., is a federal case. That said, many of the
arguments for mandatory recusal statements would apply with equal force in the
context of state courts.
2 In addition to the reasons for a recusal being set out in the motion papers, judges
are also strongly encouraged to issue statements when they deny disqualification
motions. See RICHARD E. FLAMM, Judicial DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 645 (2nd ed. 2007). Some jurisdictions even make
the issuance of such statements mandatory. See id at 646 n.4 (citing Kurz v.
Justices of the S. Ct. of N.Y., 654 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1997)).
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To put the arguments in context, this article will first lay out the
highly unusual procedural history of Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.
Next, the article will use the facts of Comer to illustrate several
problems created, exacerbated, or made insoluble by voluntary
recusal without the issuance of a recusal statement. Finally, the
article will propose two statutory provisions for suggested inclusion
in the federal judicial recusal statutes. Those provisions would
require judges to issue basic recusal statements whenever they
become disqualified and more detailed statements in appropriate
circumstances without requiring a level of detail that would over
burden the judiciary or impinge too far upon the privacy interests of
individual federal judges.
I. THE SORDID PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF COMER V. MURPHY OIL
USA, INc.
On its merits, Comer was one of a handful of politically charged
climate change related lawsuits filed in the federal courts. Although
a step behind Connecticut v. American Elec. Power Inc. , Comer was
followed by environmental law blogs and journals since shortly after
its complaint was filed.5 The plaintiffs in Comer named numerous
major oil companies in their complaint, alleging that the companies'
roles in increasing greenhouse gas emissions contributed to global
warming, making Hurricane Katrina more severe, and causing
damage to the plaintiffs' property.6 Like American Electric Power,
the Comer plaintiffs alleged causes of action both in negligence and
'7public nuisance. Also like American Electric Power, Comer was
3 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 859-61 (5th Cir. 2009) [hereinafter
Comer 1] (reversing district court in part).
4 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
5 See, e.g., Gilbert S. Keteltas, Climate Change Lawsuits, NAT. L. J. Apr. 30, 2007,
at 12.
6 Comer I, 585 F.3d at 859-61.
7 Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2529; Comer I, 585 F.3d at 859-61.
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initially dismissed at the district court level, by order dated August
30, 2007.8
In Comer, no written opinion accompanies the order of
dismissal. Instead the basis for the judge's ruling was read into the
record at the hearing. 9 According to the transcript, the case was
dismissed for lack of standing on the grounds that global warming
litigation presents a non-justiciable political question. 10
Much has been written elsewhere regarding the merits of Comer,
the applicability of the political question doctrine to Comer and other
climate change lawsuits, and the affects those lawsuits may have on
tort and insurance law nationwide.11 Those issues are beyond the
scope of this article. Instead, this article focuses on the issues of
judicial ethics implicated by decisions of the Fifth Circuit in this
case.
Corner's tortuous path toward appellate review encountered its
first obstacle almost immediately. The appeal was never decided by
the original three judge panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to
which it was assigned. 12 On the day oral argument was scheduled to
be heard in the case, one judge was kept away by a family
8 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
vacated and remanded, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009) rej 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011);
Comer I, 585 F.3d at 860.
9 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05CV436LGRHW, 2007 WL 6942285,
at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007).
10 Id.
11 See, e.g., Jeremy Hessler, A Temporary Solution to Climate Change: The
Federal Common Law to the Rescue?, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 407, 409 (2011)
(" [C]limate change litigation could be a step forward in our nation's policy of
regulating pollutants that cause climate change."); James S. Malloy & John M.
Sylvester, Insurance Coverage for Global Warming Liability Claims, 45 TORT
TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 811 (2010) (discussing developments in environmental
litigation); Mary Kathryn Nagle, Tracing the Origins of Fairly Traceable: The
Black Hole of Private Climate Change Litigation, 85 TUL. L. REv. 477, 500-02
(2010) (discussing the standing and political question doctrine aspects of Comer);
Victor E. Schwartz et al., Why Trial Courts Have Been Quick to Cool "'Global
Warming" Suits, 77 TENN. L. REv. 803, 805 (2010) (arguing that global warming
cases in tort should be dismissed for failure to state a claim); see also Am. Elec.
Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2535 (affirming on the political question doctrine issue
because the court split four justices to four justices).
12 See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, No. 07-60756 (5th Cir. argued Aug. 8, 2008).
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emergency. Of the remaining two judges, a second subsequently
recused himself, requiring that the case be reassigned to a second
panel and that oral argument take place a second time. 13 The second
panel reversed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs'
nuisance, trespass, and negligence claims, finding that the district
court had erred in concluding that the political question doctrine
required dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims.
14
Between November 27 and December 2, 2009, the defendants
petitioned for rehearing en banc by the full Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 15 Without issuing recusal memos, seven of the judges on
the Fifth Circuit recused themselves from both the case and the
petition for rehearing. 16 At that time, there was one vacancy on the
Fifth Circuit. 17 The minimum number of judges required to
participate in order for the court to have a quorum to vote to grant
rehearing was nine.18 All nine of the remaining judges participated
and on January 26, 2010 the circuit, by a six to three vote, granted
rehearing. 19
Where a rehearing en banc has been granted, many circuits have
local rules containing a provision designed to prevent attorneys and
20lower courts from relying upon potentially suspect panel decisions.
In the Fifth Circuit, local rule 41.3 fulfills that role and provides that
a grant of rehearing "vacates the panel opinion and judgment ... and
stays the mandate., 21 Thus, when the circuit voted on February 26,
2010 to rehear the case en banc, the panel decision in Comer I was
13 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1058 (5th Cir. 2010) (Dennis, J.,
dissenting) [hereinafter Comer I1]
14 Comer I, 585 F.3d at 879-80.
15 See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, No. 07-60756 (5th Cir. argued Nov. 3, 2008).
16 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 598 F.3d 208, 210 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2010)
[hereinafter Order Granting Rehearing] (granting rehearing en banc and listing the
recused judges in a footnote).
17 Comer II, 607 F.3d at 1065 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
18 Id. at 1055 (Davis, J., dissenting).
19 Id.
20 id.
21 5th Cir. R. 41.3 available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/docs/default-
source/forms-and-documents---clerks-office/rules/5thcir-iop.pdf.
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automatically vacated.22 As will be seen, in Comer, local rule 41.3
ended up determining the outcome of the merits of the litigation
rather than serving simply as a procedural safeguard for the en banc
23rehearing process.
Despite being fully briefed on the issues, the en banc panel never
24reached the merits of the case. Less than two months after the en
banc court granted rehearing, "new circumstances [had] arisen that
[made] it necessary for another judge to recuse, leaving only eight
members of the court able to participate in the case. ,25 Like the
judges who recused themselves prior to the grant of rehearing, the
newly recusing judge, the Hon. Jennifer Walker Elrod, issued no
statement identifying her reasons for recusal or any explanation as to
what the "new circumstances" requiring her to step aside at this later
26procedural state were. Nevertheless in this case, because of its
timing, Judge Elrod's recusal became the most important decision at
the Fifth Circuit level. With Elrod gone, the panel was reduced to
eight judges; one below the minimum number of judges required for
27en banc quorum.
After becoming aware of the reduction in the membership of the
panel, the court contacted the parties and requested additional
briefing on whether the court still retained a quorum to hear the case,
and if not, what authority it had with regard to the case going
forward. 28 The parties submitted letter briefs on the issue and on
May 28, 2010 the court issued an order, with a five to three majority
29
of the remaining judges agreeing, that the court lacked a quorum.
The court discussed and dismissed several proposed cures for the
22 See id; Comer II, 607 F.3d at 1053.
23 See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 718 F.3d 460, 467-69 (5th Cir. 2013)
[hereinafter Comer 2013]; Comer II, 607 F.3d at 1055 (dismissing the appeal
without reinstating the decision in Comer 1); see also in re Comer, 131 S. Ct. 902
(2011) (denying mandamus).
24 See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, No. 07-60756 (5th Cir. argued Nov. 3, 2008).25Letter to the Parties Notifying Them of Loss of Quorum and Canceling Oral
Argument, Comer v. Murphy Oil USA Inc., No. 07-60756 (5th Cir. April 30,
2010), ECF No. 00511097646.
26 See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, No. 07-60756 (5th Cir. argued Nov. 3, 2008).
27 Comer II, 607 F.3d at 1055-56.
28 Id. at 1058.
29 Id. at 1055-56.
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problem of lack of quorum. These included a request that, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 291, Chief Justice Roberts designate a judge from
another circuit; interpreting Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
35(a) to define quorum such that the court did have a quorum;
"holding the case in abeyance" until the vacancy on the court was
filled; dis-enbancing and reinstating the panel opinion; and
"[a]dopting the Rule of Necessity" to allow one or more of the
recused judges to participate in the case. 3° Rejecting all of these
options, the sub-majority held it could not "conduct judicial
business" as a consequence of the lack of quorum. 3 1 The court
further held, somewhat paradoxically, that because of its quorumless
status it was powerless to take any action other than to dismiss the
appeal.32
All three members of the Comer I panel, Judges Davis, Dennis,
and Stewart dissented.33 Davis issued a dissenting opinion, which
Stewart joined and Dennis issued a separate dissent, but noted his
general agreement with Davis. 34  The dissents offered different
30 Id. at 1054-55.
31 Id. at 1055.
32 Id. Whether and how much precedential weight Comer II should be entitled to
is an interesting question. Given that Comer II was decided by a proportionally
small majority of a quorumless court, Comer II presents a particularly sharp
example of the minority-majority problem. See generally, Jonathan Remy Nash,
The Majority That Wasn 't: Stare Decisis, Majority Rule, and The Mischief of
Quorum Requirements, 58 EMORY L.J. 831 (2009) (discussing the precedential
value of decisions made where the number of judges in the majority of a particular
opinion is less than a majority of the number of judges on the court due to
vacancy, disqualification, or absence). Although a detailed discussion of that issue
is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth mentioning that American
Jurisprudence, Second Edition and Corpus Juris Secundum have already included
Comer II in the cumulative supplement portions of their online editions. In
subsequent litigation raising the same issues, the Fifth Circuit also declined to give
Comer II res judicata effect. Rather, the Circuit has subsequently determined that
the district court's verbal opinion is the relevant final judgment in the case. Comer
2013, 718 F.3d at 469.
33 Comer II, 607 F.3d at 1055.
31 Id. at 1055, 1057 n.2 (Dennis J., dissenting).
183
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interpretations of all of the options considered by the court,
35including the definition of a quorum.
The concluding statement to the en banc court's order dismissing
the appeal that "[t]he parties, of course, now have the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States" is somewhat ironic
in retrospect 6 The plaintiffs accepted the majority's invitation to
appeal, petitioning the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ
of mandamus. 7 Most appeals to the United States Supreme Court
(either by mandamus or certiorari) are, of course, discretionary and
rarely granted.38 Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court declined to
grant the petition without comment, leaving the trial court order,
without written opinion, as the only disposition of the case on the
merits.39
This end of the case, brought about as a consequence of a mass
recusal followed by a late recusal, had a peculiar and disturbing
consequence in this instance. Having automatically vacated the
October 15, 2009 three-judge panel decision by the operation of its
local rule, the sub-majority's order of dismissal left the district
court's determination untouched and, despite the lack of a
15 Id. at 1055-66 (Davis, J., dissenting) (Dennis, J., dissenting). The issues raised
by the dissenting judges highlight other procedural problems and ambiguities in
need of redress. An in depth analysis of those concerns is beyond the scope of this
article but the most obvious and some potential solutions are: 1) the ambiguity as
to the definition of "quorum" under 28 U.S.C. § 46(d) which could be solved by
legislation clarifying the statute, 2) inadequate local rule structures to cope with
the loss of quorum, which could be addressed by amended local rules
automatically reinstating panel opinions if an en banc court's quorum is lost, 3)
whether the Rule of Necessity can be invoked by a court of appeals, which would
easily be remedied by codifying the rule to adopt one position or the other, and 4)
the non-mandatory nature of requesting a judge from another circuit be designated
where the alternative is dismissal of an appeal without a decision on the merits,
which could be solved by amending designation statutes to require that the request
be made in such circumstances.
36 Comer II, 607 F.3d at 1055 (majority opinion).
37 See in re Comer, No. 10-294 (U.S. appeal docketed Aug. 30, 2010).
31 See Supreme Court Order List for January 10, 2011, available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/01101 lzor.pdf at 26.
39 In re Comer, 131 S. Ct. 902 (2011) (denying mandamus).
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determinative appellate review on the merits, entitled to res judicata
40
effects in later cases.
The mass recusal followed by an unexplained recusal, the timing
of which ultimately resulted in the reversal of a decision on the
merits of a properly constituted appellate panel, brings to the
forefront several important reasons why the practice of voluntary
judicial recusal without comment from the recusing judge is a
practice that, for both constitutional and practical reasons, must end.
II. RECUSAL IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
A brief overview of the purposes and machinery of federal
judicial recusal is required to put the following discussion in the
proper context. It is beyond the scope of this article to delve too
deeply into the history and purposes of judicial recusal and
disqualification. Entire treatises have been written on the subject.41
However, as the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly
stated: "impartiality and the appearance of impartiality in a judicial
officer are the sine qua non of the American legal system. 42 The
purpose of an impartial tribunal is obvious enough. "It is axiomatic
that a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process. 43  The need for the appearance of impartiality is less
obvious. Indeed, traditional common law disqualification had no
such express purpose and required a judge to step down if he
possessed a "direct financial interest in the case, and for nothing
else."44
Unlike common law, the present American federal system
directly recognizes the importance of maintaining the appearance of
40 Comer 2013, 718 F.3d at 467-69.
41 See, e.g., FLAMM, supra note 3.
42 Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 789 (3d Cir. 1982) (directing that upon remand a
case be assigned to a different trial judge so that "the appearance of justice will be
served.")
43 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009).
44 John A. Meiser, Note, The (Non)Problem of a Limited Due Process Right to
Judicial Disqualification, 84 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1799, 1804 (2009).
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impartiality as well as an absence of actual bias.45 One reason is that
these two goals, impartiality and its appearance, are interrelated-the
latter can implicate the former where the appearance of bias is strong
enough.46 A second, more common, reason is that the maintenance
of public confidence in the judiciary is a sweeping and institutional
concern for any system of justice. 47  "Justice must satisfy the
appearance of justice" has long been a watchword of American
48recusal jurisprudence. Confidence in the judiciary is never
undermined more than by "the failure of judges to comply with
established professional norms, including rules of conduct
specifically prescribed.,
49
Public confidence in the judiciary can be diminished not only by
actual misconduct, but also by the perception of misconduct. A
judge needs not be biased or act improperly to raise questions as to
the integrity of the judicial process. 50 The unique position of the
federal courts in our government places the appearance of neutrality
in a place of similar importance to that of actual neutrality. As
Justice Frankfurter pointed out, judicial "authority-possessed of
neither the purse nor the sword-ultimately rests on sustained public
confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by
the Court's complete detachment, in fact and in appearance.,
51
Although this "stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who
have no actual bias, , 52 its purpose is justified by the fact that
"[j]udicial decisions rendered under circumstances suggesting bias
or favoritism tend to breed skepticism, undermine the integrity of the
45 See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
46 See, e.g., Caperton, 556 U.S. at 876 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (holding that there "are circumstances in which experience teaches that
the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision maker is too high
to be constitutionally tolerable").
47 See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864 (1988).
48 Offut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 13 (1954).
49 Roger J. Miner, Judicial Ethics in the Twenty-First Century: Tracing the
Trends, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1107, 1108 (2004).
50 See, Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 860 (discussing how a conflict of which a judge is
unaware can still require recusal).
51 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
52 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
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courts, and generally thwart the principles upon which our
jurisprudential system is based., 53
It is important to remember that the impact of the appearance of
judicial bias can cut both ways. Judges must consider both the
appearance of the decision to recuse and the appearance of the
decision not to recuse. To achieve the second purpose of the recusal
mechanism, promoting confidence in the judiciary, recusal must be
used in a manner that is not self-defeating. Recusal where
inappropriate, or under circumstances that raise questions as to the
propriety of the recusal decision itself, "would only serve to
undermine public confidence in the impartiality of all judges., 54 As
discussed in Part III.D below, voluntary recusals made without
issuing a statement can run afoul of this very concern.
In express pursuance of these twin aims, in 1974 Congress broke
with the common law by amending the federal recusal statutes to
require disqualification where a judge's impartiality may
"reasonably be questioned" in addition to where the more traditional
and direct sources of bias are present.55 Despite the fact that the
1974 changes effectively abolished the older "duty to sit" doctrine,
judges are still expected to remain on cases where the applicable
recusal statutes do not require their disqualification.56  Broadly,
53 FLAMM, supra note 3, at 110.
54 In re Vt. Supreme Court Admin. Directive No. 17. v. Vt. Supreme Court, 576
A.2d 127, 131 (Vt. 1990) (quoting State v. Hunt, 527 A.2d 223, 224 (Vt. 1987)).
55 See Litkey v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 546-48 (1994) (discussing the 1974
changes to 28 U.S.C. § 455).
56 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Chief William's Ghost: The Problematic Persistence of the
Duty to Sit, 57 Buff. L. Rev 813, 821 (2009) ("[T]he nature of ajudgeship implies
that the judge has a responsibility to hear and decide cases, one that should not be
shirked for political or personal reasons. To the extent one views the duty to sit as
a general and rebuttable obligation to preside over a case unless disqualified, it is
unobjectionable."); see also Jeffrey M. Hayes, To Recuse or To Refuse: Self-
Judging and The Reasonable Person Problem, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 85, 92 n.33
(2008) (observing that "[m]ost circuits take the approach that a judge has just as
much of a duty to sit as he does to recuse himself' and collecting cases)
[hereinafter Hayes]; but see Luke McFarland, Note, Is Anyone Listening? The
Duty To Sit Still Matters Because the Justices Say It Does, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 677 (2011).
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under federal statutes and the Code of Conduct for United States
Judges, there are five situations where it is mandatory that a federal
judge recuse himself or herself from a case.57 These are where:
1) the judge has a personal bias about a party or has
personal knowledge of disputed facts in the case;
2) the judge, or a lawyer with whom the judge
previously practiced law, served as a lawyer in the
matter in controversy, or the judge or lawyer has
been a material witness in the matter;
3) the judge, judge's spouse, or minor child has any
financial interest in the subject matter in
controversy or in a party, or any other interest that
could be affected substantially by the outcome of
the proceeding;
4) the judge's spouse, or a close relative is a party, a
lawyer, a witness, or has some interest that could
be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding; or
5) the judge served in previous governmental
employment and participated as a judge, counsel,
advisor, or material witness concerning the
proceeding, or expressed an opinion concerning
the merits of the particular case in controversy.
58
There is also mandatory, but waiveable, disqualification under 28
U.S.C. § 455(a), which is applicable where a judge's "impartiality
might reasonably be questioned. 59 Moreover, a judge also has an
ongoing ethical and statutory duty to "inform himself about his
personal and fiduciary financial interests, and make a reasonable
effort to inform himself about the personal financial interests of his
57 Examining the State of Judicial Recusals After Caperton v. A. T. Massey:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the Comm. on
the Judiciary H.R., 11 th Cong. 6 (2009) (statement of Hon. M. Margaret
McKeown, Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit District, San
Diego, CA) [hereinafter McKeown Statement].51Id. at 2-3.
59 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2012).
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spouse and minor children.",60 Further, all federal judges are
required by the Ethics in Government Act to file extremely detailed
financial statements annually. 61 Those statements are supposed to be
used in tandem with a computerized conflict checking system, which
should automatically flag potential financial conflicts for judges as
soon as a case appears in the system, allowing a judge to spot
situations where they must recuse well in advance of taking any
62
action in the case.
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH JUDICIAL OPACITY IN VOLUNTARY
RECUSAL CASES
Comer well illustrates how voluntary recusal without a
disclosure of the reasons for the recusal can create a host of
problems, harming the public perception of the federal courts and
raising constitutional concerns. Several of those issues are discussed
in context below.
A. The Appearance of Propriety and Impartiality Can be
Compromised
"The very purpose of [recusal statutes] is to promote confidence
,,63in the judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of impropriety.
Voluntary recusals, which are not explained to the litigants and the
general public, have the potential to thwart that basic purpose. The
absence of explanation can be particularly troubling in the case of
60 28 U.S.C. § 455(c); Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Cannon 3 §
(C)(2) (containing identical language to § 455(c)); see also Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at
862 n.9 (" [N] otwithstanding the size and complexity of the litigation, judges
remain under a duty to stay informed of any personal or fiduciary financial interest
they may have in cases over which they preside.").
6 5 U.S.C. app. § 103-04 (2010).
62 Karen Redmond, Broad Array of Tools Ensures Fair and Impartial
Adjudication, THE THIRD BRANCH NEWS, Dec. 10, 2009, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/09-12-
10/Broad Array of ToolsEnsuresFair and Impartial Adjudication.aspx.
63 Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 865.
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appellate courts, since "for all practical purposes, no review exists of
appellate judges' recusal decisions., 64 The late recusal in Comer
had exactly that negative effect, leading commentators to question
the competence and the impartiality of the Fifth Circuit.65
The timing of the late recusal in Comer was "a shock" to most
observers, considering the sweeping round of recusals that preceded
the vote to rehear the case en banc.66 Because of the initial mass
recusal, the unusual circumstances surrounding the last judge's
recusal, and the ultimate outcome, skepticism as to whether
improper reasons underlay Comer II left commentators with an
arched eyebrow.67 Some "environmentalists . . . viewed the
[recusals and decision] as a sign that the [oil] industry has all but
captured the appeals court in the Gulf region. , 68 One commentator
went so far as to say that unless the Supreme Court granted the
mandamus petition and restored the panel opinion, it would "be very
64 Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts,
87 IOWAL. REV. 1213, 1221 (2002). The issue of unexplained recusal
determinations in the United States Supreme Court has gotten more attention than
the problem as it arises in the Circuit Courts of Appeal. See, e.g., Suzanne Levy,
Comment, Your Honor, Please Explain: Why Congress Can, and Should, Require
Justices to Publish Reasons for Their Recusal Decisions, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1161 (2014) (discussing the problem of recusal decisions made without
explanation in the United States Supreme Court).
65 See, e.g., Climate Change and the Courts: A Curious Case of Judicial Recusal,
WALL ST. J.COM (May 18, 2010, 12:01 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870463520457524236113530765
0 [hereinafter Curious Case] (In Comer, did one of the more liberal Fifth Circuit
judges buy stock specifically to blow up the quorum? That isn't as far-fetched as
it sounds.").
66 Melissa Maleske, Comer v. Murphy Oil Leaves the Future of Climate Change




67 See, e.g., Anderson, A Miscarriage of Justice, THUS BLOGGED ANDERSON (May
29, 2010), http://thusbloggedanderson.blogspot.com/2010/05/judicial-
depravity. html.
68 Elana Schor, Pivotal Climate Change Test Case Dismissed For Now, WASH.
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difficult to avoid the conclusion that Americans can't sue Big Oil
and win. And that the Fifth Circuit has some judges who are unclear
on the concept of 'justice."', 69 Even commentators who declined to
question the integrity of the Comer sub-majority, many of whom
were opposed to the suit on its merits, derided the result as
"curiouser and curiouser, a "shameful disappearing act," 71
"boggling the minds of lawyers and non-lawyers alike," 72 "an
inappropriate way to end a case,'7 3 "a rather bizarre decision, ,74 and
"an exceedingly unfair conclusion to five years of litigation." 75
Even the extremely conservative Washington Times,76 which had
been particularly hostile to the decision in Comer 1,77 remarked that
69 Anderson, supra note 68.
70 Howard Bashman, Fifth Circuit's En Banc Disposition of Global Warming-
Related Case Can Only Be Described as Curiouser and Curiouser, How
APPEALING (May 28, 2010, 11:58 PM),
http://howappealing.law.com/052810.html#038172.
71 Jonathan R. Nash, 5th Circuit's Shameful Disappearing Act, NAT'L L. J., July
12, 2010.
72 Seth Jaffe, Due Process? We Don't Need No Stinkin 'Due Process, L. & ENV'T
(June 1, 2010), http://www.lawandenvironment.com/2010/06/01/due-process-we-
dont-need-no-stinkin-due-process.
73 Jonathan H. Adler, Writ of Mandamus Sought in Comer v. Murphy Oil, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Aug. 27, 2010, 5:12 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/O8/27/writ-
of-mandamus-sought-in-comer-v-murphy-oil.
74 Steven M. Taber, Fifth Circuit Punts on Comer v. Murphy Oil Appeal
Dismisses Appeal on Procedural Grounds, Not Merits, ENVTL. L. & CLIMATE
CHANGE L. BLOG (June 4, 2010), http://taberlaw.wordpress.com/2010/06/04/fifth-
circuit-punts-on-comer-v-murphy-oil-appeal-dismisses-appeal-on-procedural-
grounds-not-merits.
75 Ann Powers, Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, En Banc in the Fifth Circuit. What
Were They Thinking?!?!, GREENLAW (Aug. 31, 2010),
http://greenilaw.blogs.law.pace.edu/2010/08/3 1/comer-v-murphy-oil-usa-en-banc-
in-the-fifth-circuit-what-were-they-thinking [hereinafter Taber].
76 See, e.g., Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, What Drives Media Slant?
Evidencefrom U.S. Daily Newspapers, 78 ECONOMETRICA 35, 42, 47 (Jan. 2010)
(showing the conservative leanings of the Washington Times readership and
highlighting the publication's propensity for using conservative, politically
charged language).
77 See, e.g., Quin Hillyer, Editorial, No Butterfly Caused Katrina, WASH. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/mar/18/no-butterfly-
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Comer II was "an unusual decision marked by significant
controversy."7
Politics, of course, played into this wave of negative speculation.
That the late recusal came from Judge Elrod, an appointee of
President George W. Bush, and all but one of the judges in the sub-
majority of Comer II were appointed by either President Bush
(Judges Prado, Owen, and Clement) or President Ronald Reagan
(Judge Jolly), probably also fueled speculation that the decision was
politically motivated.79
It is important to observe that the comments I have just
recounted are probably neither fair nor accurate to the extent that
they accuse the membership of the Fifth Circuit of impropriety. Any
accusation that the Fifth Circuit was in the pocket of the oil industry
at that time, or that it is now, is almost certainly untrue. My own
experience with members of the federal judiciary leads me to believe
that federal judges, regardless of the political affiliations of their
appointing presidents, are exceedingly ethical and, while their
judicial philosophies may differ, they simply will not manipulate the
federal judicial machinery to rig the outcome of a case so as to
benefit some particular set of parties. 8°
The truth of the comments, however, is beside the point. Such
speculations need not be true to affect the appearance of impartiality
caused-katrina (describing the plaintiffs' claims as "foolishness" and a "perfect
storm of fantasy fulfillment" for "leftists").
78 Douglas Smith, Courtroom Gasbags Blow Blackmail Plan, WASH. TIMES, June
10, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jun/10/courtroom-
gasbags-blow-blackmail-plan.
79 United States Court ofAppeals for the Fifth Circuit, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United-States-Court of Appeals for the FifthCirc
uit#Current composition of the court (last visited Jan. 9, 2010); see also Judicial
Gusher: the Fifth Circuit's Ties to Oil, ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE 7,
http://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/fifth circuitjudgesreport.pdf
(last visited Feb. 15, 2015) [hereinafter Judicial Gusher] ("Notably, out of the
sixteen active judges on the Fifth Circuit, more than one third were appointed by
President George W. Bush, and twelve out of the sixteen were appointed by
Republican presidents.").
"o Having clerked for two federal judges appointed by presidents of different
political parties, I also have the benefit of a perspective unavailable to most
members of the general public.
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of the court.81 While the timing of the late recusal and its effect on
quorum may have been unavoidable, the impact on the circuit's
reputation could have been mitigated by greater transparency. The
lack of information provided to the parties and the general public as
to the reasons for the late recusal certainly made the appearance of
the circuit court's ultimate decision to dismiss seem all the more
suspect. 82 The en banc court did not expressly identify which judge
had been the one to recuse, saying only that "new circumstances
arose that caused the disqualification and recusal of one of the nine
judges. 83 This left it up to the litigants to deduce that it was Judge
Elrod by comparing the order granting rehearing with the letter
informing them of the loss of quorum.84 The lack of detail further
opened the court up to speculation as to what the "new
circumstances" could possibly have been at that stage of the
proceedings.85
It is inevitable that such speculation will take place in cases
86where judicial integrity has become an issue. A core purpose of
81 See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864-65 (1988)
("[P]eople who have not served on the bench are often all too willing to indulge
suspicions and doubts concerning the integrity of judges.").
82 See Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to
Judicial Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 560-62, 579 (2005) (arguing that a
recusing judge "should take some responsibility to ensure that the facts [of his
recusal] are accurately presented to the public from the beginning" so that the
judiciary's reputation is not damaged by inaccurate reporting) [hereinafter Frost].
83 Comer II, 607 F.3d 1049, 1053-54 (5th Cir. 2010).
84 Compare id. at 1053 (listing the judges hearing the appeal and omitting Judge
Elrod's name) with Order Granting Rehearing, 598 F.3d 208, 210 (5th Cir. Feb.
26, 2010) (listing the judges hearing the appeal and including Judge Elrod's
name).
s5 See, e.g., Curious Case, supra note 66 (speculating that "another judge acquired
a financial interest in one of the defendants").
86 See Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 864-65 ("[P]eople who have not served on the bench
are often all too willing to indulge suspicions and doubts concerning the integrity
of judges."). A particularly apt example of the unavoidable speculation that
attaches to these sorts of cases is that Judges Dennis and Davis, members of the
Comer I panel and authors of the dissents in Comer II, were subsequently
criticized for their ties to the oil industry in the BP oil spill litigation. See Judicial
Gusher, supra note 79, at 5-8.
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recusal statutes is the minimization of the impact of such speculation
on the perceived integrity of the judiciary. 87 By increasing
speculation here, the lack of explanation of the reasons for the late
recusal hindered rather than aided the perception of judicial
integrity.88
Comer is highly illustrative of this point because the lack of
explanation as to the "new circumstances" requiring the late recusal
could paint a particularly troubling picture to a skeptical observer.
In particular, it appears that most of the conflicts which would have
required Judge Elrod's recusal should have been detectable before
the initial vote on whether to grant rehearing en banc. Taking the
bases for recusal outlined above in turn:
(1) Whether or not a judge has a bias or personal knowledge of
the case should be apparent virtually immediately upon
being assigned the case. Hence, Judge Elrod should have
been aware of any potential conflict based upon personal
bias or personal knowledge long before the vote on
rehearing.
(2) Judge Elrod has never personally appeared in the matter and
it does not appear that any other attorney with whom she
practiced law did either. Judge Elrod's only time in private
practice was at Baker Botts toward the beginning of her
legal career. 89 Given the narrow construction of the term
"previously practiced law," it seems unlikely that any of the
attorneys involved would qualify. 9° Regardless, whether an
87 See Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 859-60 (stating that the purpose of the federal recusal
statute is "to promote public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process"
and citing to the legislative history).
88 For another illustration of where recusal statements are needed, see the letter to
Congress signed by over one hundred law professors urging, among other things,
that members of the Supreme Court be required to issue recusal statements when
they choose to deny a disqualification motion. Letter from Mark N. Aaronson et
al. to Judiciary Comms., Changing Ethical and Recusal Rules for Supreme Court
Justices 2-3 (Mar. 27, 2011), available at http://www.afj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/judicial ethics sign on letter.pdf.
" See Jennifer Walker Elrod, in ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Aspen
Publishers 2015), available at 2015 WL 7335.
90 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) (2012). To create a conflict under that provision the
attorney must be presently and personally participating in the case. See FLAMM,
194
ol. 1 , No. 2
REVERSAL BYRECUSAL
attorney appearing in the case practiced law with the judge
or not should have been known to Judge Elrod prior to the
vote to rehear. 91 Only two attorneys entered appearances
after the vote to rehear but before the letter informing the
parties of Judge Elrod's recusal. 92 Neither of the two
lawyers, both of whom represented amici, ever worked for
Baker Botts, however. 
93
(3) The automated conflict-checking system should have
informed Judge Elrod of any financial conflicts and the
corresponding need to recuse well in advance of any action
being taken in the matter.
94
(4) That same conflict-checking system should have also alerted
Judge Elrod to other interests her family may have had in the
litigation, as federal judges are required to compile a list of
potential conflicts beyond their simple financial statements.
95
(5) Judge Elrod never participated in the matter, in any capacity,
before the case came to the Fifth Circuit, and, even if she
had, that should also have been a circumstance she was
aware of prior to participating in the vote for en banc
rehearing.
96
supra note 3, at 1102. In the Fifth Circuit, an attorney not presently participating
in the representation but who is both related to the judge and a partner in a firm
appearing in the matter also requires recusal. See Hayes, supra note 57, at 95.
91 See McKeown Statement, supra note 57, at 5-6 (describing the software used by
courts to flag potential conflicts automatically).
92 See Docket Sheet, Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, No. 07-60756 (5th Cir. June 18,
2013) (reporting that the court granted a rehearing on Feb. 26, 2010; attorneys
James Robert May and Sean Hoe Donahue filed appearance forms on Apr. 23,
2010; and Judge Elrod recused herself on Apr. 30, 2010).
93 See About Sean Donahue, DONAHUE & GOLDBERG LLP,
http://www.donahuegoldberg.com/attomeys.html#donahue (last visited Feb. 15,
2015); James R. May, WIDENER LAW,
http://law.widener.edu/Academics/Faculty/ProfilesDe/MayJamesR.aspx (last
visited Feb. 15, 2015).
94 Maleske, supra 67.95 McKeown Statement, supra note 58, at 5-6.
96 See Jennifer Walker Elrod, in ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Aspen
Publishers 2015), available at 2015 WL 7335 (indicating that Judge Elrod left
private practice in 2002, prior to the events giving rise to the litigation).
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The foregoing analysis leaves only three possibilities that
would explain the need for a late recusal. First, Judge Elrod, or a
close family member, may have somehow acquired a new financial
or other personal interest in the outcome of the litigation between the
grant of rehearing en banc and the letter to the parties canceling oral
argument. This could have happened if Judge Elrod or a family
member had purchased stocks or other financial instruments tied to
one of the defendants. 97  Second, Judge Elrod initially made a
mistake in her original conflict check before participating in the vote
to rehear the case and did, in fact, have a conflict of interest
requiring mandatory recusal at the time she voted to rehear the
case. 98 Third, Judge Elrod recused under the reasonable appearance
provision of § 455(a). 99
The first two explanations are the most potentially damaging to
the appearance of propriety without disclosure, even though Judge
Elrod may be entirely blameless if all facts are known. 100 The
specter that a late, case-altering recusal occurred because a judge did
not live up to her obligation to accurately check for personal
conflicts of interest before taking important actions in a case, or that
she did not make reasonable efforts to ensure that she or her close
relatives refrained from acquiring new interests in the case or the
parties during the pendency of the appeal, undermines the
appearance that the Fifth Circuit is impartial and primarily interested
in meting out justice.101
97 See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (2012) ("He knows that he, individually or as a
fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial
interest in the subject matter in controversy.").
98 This possibility would also raise some of the retroactivity and due process
concerns addressed infra.
99 See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2012) (requiring a judge to disqualify herself if her
"impartiality might reasonably be questioned").
100 Judge Elrod could have become recused on the basis of a financial interest
through no doing of her own. For example, if some sufficiently close blood
relative of Judge Elrod, over whom she had utterly no control, were to have
acquired an interest in one of the parties, she would have needed to recuse. This
would be true even if Judge Elrod had attempted to convince this hypothetical
relative not to do so and been ignored. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(iii) (2012).
101 See Curious Case, supra note 66 (speculating that "it's likely another judge
acquired a financial interest in one of the defendants").
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The final possibility, as noted, is that the late recusal was
pursuant to § 455(a). 102 However, it is worth noting that whatever
the "new circumstance" 103 giving rise to disqualification under
Section § 455(a) may be, additional problems arise if Judge Elrod
only became aware of the appearance of impropriety after voting for
rehearing en banc but the facts creating the potential appearance
predated the vote on en banc rehearing. Because violations of §
455(a) require no element of scienter-knowledge of the violation
on the part of the judge-a judge can be in violation of this section
before he or she becomes aware of the circumstances that give rise to
the appearance of impropriety. 10 4 The upshot is that only entirely
new circumstances, not the new awareness of previously existing
circumstances, would save the late recusal in Comer from the
retroactivity and due process concerns discussed infra 10 5
All of these options may be troubling to an observer but may
also be made less troubling by additional disclosure. Even in the
case of a potentially embarrassing disclosure (such as a mistake as to
the content of personal financial holdings) or where recusal due to
new circumstances makes it possible to reasonably question Judge
Elrod's impartiality under § 455(a), the issuance of a recusal
memorandum stating as much would have been better for the image
of the Fifth Circuit writ large and Judge Elrod individually. Silence
simply opens the door to the kind of speculation recounted above. 106
Moreover, if the late recusal was under § 455(a), the timing of the
102 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) ("Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United
States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.").
103 Comer II, 607 F.3d 1049, 1053-54 (5th Cir. 2010) (stating that "new
circumstances arose that caused the disqualification and recusal of one of the nine
judges").
104 See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859 (1988)
(Scienter is not an element of a violation of § 455(a).").
105 See id. at 859-61 (stating that § 455(a) may be applied "retroactively" and does
not require scienter for a violation).
106 See, e.g., Curious Case, supra note 66 ("No further explanation was offered,
but it's likely another judge acquired a financial interest in one of the
defendants.").
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recusal may raise further, avoidable concerns. Those concerns are
discussed in the sections that follow.
B. Non-Disclosure Defeats the Waiver Provision in § 455(a)
The decision not to disclose the reason for the late recusal may
have also denied the parties the opportunity to acquire an appellate
decision on the merits of the case. If Judge Elrod recused pursuant
to § 455(a), that conflict could potentially have been waived by the
parties. 107 Unlike the situations outlined above-which are
essentially a paraphrase of § 455(b) and are not waivable-the
"mandatory" recusal under § 455(a) may, in fact, be waived by the
parties pursuant to § 455(e). 108
"The process [of obtaining a waiver] is transparent and is
designed to avoid placing pressure on parties to waive a judge's
decision to disqualify." 10 9 For waiver to be effective, the recusing
judge must make a full statement on the record of what
circumstances he believes exist that provide a reasonable person
good cause to doubt his impartiality. 1 0
The exact method of waiver does not appear to be entirely
settled, however. The Judicial Conference of the United States
believes the recusing judge must then allow the parties to
contemplate waiver outside of his presence and only may remain on
the case if all of the parties consent to the waiver "in writing or on
the record." '  However, some circuits have held, citing § 455(e),
that disclosure by the judge on the record of the potential reasons for
recusal and a lack of objection by the parties at the time of disclosure
waives the parties' right to seek the judge's later disqualification on
appeal. 112
107 See 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) ("Where the ground for disqualification arises only
under subsection (a), waiver may be accepted.").
108 Id.
109McKeown Statement, supra note 58, at 4.
110 See 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) (waiver must be "preceded by a full disclosure on the
record of the basis for disqualificationf').
111 McKeown Statement, supra note 58, at 4.
112 See, e.g., Moranv. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 648-49 (8th Cir. 2002) ("[W]here
judges have fully disclosed potential conflicts and have then retained their
198
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Regardless of the specific nuts and bolts, the upshot is that if a
judge chooses to make the underlying reasons he believes that he is
disqualified under § 455(a) known to the parties, the parties may
choose to waive the conflict and keep the judge on the case."' In
other words, if the late recusal was pursuant to § 455(a), this
procedure should have been available in Comer, providing an avenue
to maintain the en banc quorum.
That the waiver option was not pursued further undermines the
appearance of impartiality of the court and the purposes of the
availability of § 455(e)'s waiver provision. The provision is clearly
intended to encourage judges to remain on cases where they might
otherwise have been conflicted out. 114 A judge's non-disclosure
effectively shuts the door on the parties' waiver option. Here, not
presenting the parties with the option to waive the conflict points to a
more serious conflict of interest under § 455(b) and to the question
of whether the conflict predated the vote to grant rehearing en banc.
Making disclosure on the record of the reasons for recusal may
not have made Judge Elrod look particularly good, but it was the
least damaging of her options. She almost certainly undertook a §
455(a) analysis before she participated in the vote to rehear the case
en banc and, at that time, reached the conclusion that she could
participate in the case without requiring a waiver.1 5 It is hard to
imagine what "new circumstances" arose in the approximately nine
weeks after the vote to rehear that would have tipped the scales in
mandate in a case, we have been solicitous of their discretion."); United States v.
Nobel, 696 F.2d 231, 236-37 (3d Cir. 1982) ("The election to proceed after full
disclosure of the relevant facts satisfies those requisites and constitutes an
effective waiver under the statute.").
113 McKeown Statement, supra 58, at 4.
114 See, e.g., Seth E. Bloom, Judicial Bias and Financial Interest as Grounds for
Disqualification of Federal Judges, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 662 (1985) (noting
that members of Congress "objected to the inflexibility of a per se rule that did not
permit waiver" and arguing that waiver prevents "the potential loss of capable,
experienced judges, the disruption of litigation, and the resulting waste of judicial
resources").
15 The court's conflict-screening software should have flagged potential conflicts
and thus prompted the judge's analysis. See McKeown Statement, supra note 58,
at 5-6 (describing the software used by courts to flag potential conflicts).
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the other direction without those circumstances being somewhat
personally embarrassing.
Even so, if it was an option, the offer to waive the conflict should
have been presented to the parties for two reasons. First, as
mentioned, not doing so invited the kind of speculation as to Judge
Elrod's judicial integrity and that of the entire circuit court outlined
above. Second, faced with the option of allowing Judge Elrod to
continue or having the en banc court lose its quorum-a result that
no one, not even the court, could foresee at the time-the parties
may well have preferred to keep Judge Elrod and obtain a decision
on the merits. 116 This is particularly so since it was the defendants
who requested the rehearing en banc, with the probable expectation
that the court would reverse the panel in Comer I.1 7 But the
plaintiffs may have also had a shot even with Judge Elrod on the
bench because three of the non-recused judges, the eventual
dissenters in Comer II, were the same judges from the Comer I panel
and could be expected to vote as they had previously.11 8 Moreover,
considering the ultimate disposition due to the loss of quorum-
dismissal and reinstatement of the adverse district court decision-
the Comer plaintiffs had nothing to lose by going forward with an en
banc hearing on the merits. Additionally, even if the en banc court
did reverse the panel on the merits, that would have created a split
with the Second Circuit, where Connecticut v. American Electric
Power Co., Inc.11 9 had been decided, thus dramatically increasing
116 See Mason E. Lowe, Reconsidering Recusals: The Veed for Requirements for
When Not to Recuse, 59 LOY. L. REv. 947, 975 (2013) (asserting that "surely, were
[the Comer appellants] given the option of waiving any need for disqualification,
they would have preferred that to a dismissal at the hands of the disqualified judge,
particularly in an en banc situation, where a single judge's influence is more
limited than in a regular three-panel review").
117 See Taber, supra note 75 ("[A]fter the Fifth Circuit granted rehearing en banc,
most court watchers assumed this was a signal that the Fifth Circuit would reverse
itself.").
1 Compare Comer II, 607 F.3d 1049, 1055 (5th Cir. 2010) (listing Judges Davis,
Stewart, and Dennis as dissenting from the majority opinion) with Comer I, 585
F.3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2009) (listing Judges Davis, Stewart, and Dennis as
hearing the case).
119 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev 'd, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
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the chances that the Supreme Court would hear Comer.120 Finally, it
is not out of the question that, given the somewhat subjective nature
of the reasonable person analysis, 121 the parties may have simply
concluded that what Judge Elrod viewed as a § 455(a) conflict was
not one as far as they were concerned, that recusal was unnecessary,
and that they would then allow her to remain on the panel.
Given that Judge Elrod's recusal was the second late recusal
resulting in a loss of quorum since the appeal first made it to the
Fifth Circuit for review, it seems that, in the view of this author,
providing the parties with the waiver option, were it available, was
clearly the better course. When a judge becomes aware of a
violation of § 455(a), that judge is "called upon to rectify an
oversight and to take the steps necessary to maintain public
,,122teeto
confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. In the interest of
preserving the integrity of the court, Judge Elrod ought, at least, to
have offered the parties the option of continuing, even at the cost of
some potential personal embarrassment, if she was able to do so.
Having not done so and not indicated that she was unable to do so,
not only did she injure her own reputation; but the entire Fifth
Circuit has also taken a reputational hit.1 23 All of that being the case,
however, with so many of the other judges of the circuit also
recusing without explanation, the circuit was unlikely to emerge
from the en banc proceedings in Comer with a perception of
neutrality assured, regardless of whether Judge Elrod issued a
recusal statement.
C. Judicial Disclosure Could Help Prevent Future Mass or Late
Recusals
120 Taber, supra note 75 (noting that reversal of Comer I "would set up a classic
'conflict between the circuits' review of [climate change] issue[s] in the U.S.
Supreme Court").
121 See generally Hayes, supra note 57, at 99-100 (discussing the subjectivity
problem of the reasonable person standard as applied to judicial recusal cases).
122 Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 861 (1988).
123 See Lowe, supra note 117, at 956-57 (describing the Fifth Circuit's handling of
Comer II as "troubling" and contrary to the principle that recusal standards should
'promote public confidence in the judiciary").
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That over half of the membership of the Fifth Circuit voluntarily
recused, without a single judge issuing a memorandum explaining
why, is an invitation for similar trouble in the not-too-distant future.
The entire Gulf region is heavily involved with the oil industry, and
many assumed that the reason for the mass recusal in Comer was
because many judges, or their families, either have now or had in the
past ties to one or more of the major oil companies. 124 That situation
presents the very real possibility that Comer may be only the tip of
the iceberg when it comes to future mass recusals in the Fifth Circuit
or in other circuits when cases implicate large swaths of important
industries. 125 The timing of the recusals in such situations could
result in more dismissals without reaching the merits, potentially
limiting the practical liability of big oil companies, or other large
corporations, solely because of their ties to sitting federal judges.
Had the recusing judges issued memoranda explaining their reasons
for recusal, many of these potential problems with future cases could
have been avoided.
Explanation of the reasons for recusal could have helped to
mitigate the potential for late recusals in subsequent cases. Public
recusal memoranda would both make future parties aware of
potential conflicts and provide possible grounds for disqualification
motions. As it stands now, voluntary recusal generally does not,
standing alone, provide a justification for disqualification of judges
in future litigation, even where the litigation concerns one or all of
124 See Ashby Jones, Eight Judges Out: Mass Recusal Cripples 5th Circuit, WALL
ST. J. L. BLOG (June 2, 2010, 12:29 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/06/02/eight-judges-out-mass-recusal-cripples-5th-
circuit ("The recusals [in Comer], it seems, are likely due to stock-ownership
issues.").
125 See Ashby Jones, Hello? Can Anyone Down There Handle the Oil-Spill
Litigation?, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (June 2, 2010, 3:59 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/06/02/hello-hello-can-anyone-down-there-handle-
the-oil-spill-litigation (observing that half of the judges in the Eastern District of
Louisiana had recused themselves from litigation involving the 2010 BP oil spill);
see also Maleske, supra 67 (noting that the large number of defendants in Comer
"made it much more likely that a judge hearing the case would have a financial
interest in one of the energy companies or would have a spouse or family member
who worked for them or represented them in the past").
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the same parties. 126  The availability of some sort of particular
indication on the part of a judge who previously recused in a similar
matter but now seeks to remain on a case is particularly important
considering that the standards of review for appeals of judicial
decisions tend to be unfriendly to parties seeking disqualification,
and lack of evidence may make a critical difference upon appellate
review. 127 Disclosure of the reasons for a voluntary recusal would
provide parties with details that may allow them to meaningfully
raise the issue of disqualification in future cases before panels hear
oral argument or the circuit votes to rehear cases en banc.12 8 By
raising the issues early, the circuit can avoid vacating the decisions
of three-judge panels with the intention of a rehearing en banc only
to discover too late that the en banc court lacks a quorum.
Additionally, having the reasons for prior recusals available will put
parties on notice that potential disqualification issues may crop up
126 Mackey v. United States, 221 F. App'x 907, 910 (11th Cir. 2007) (writing "[ilt
is simply not true that once recused, always recused" where it held that a decision
in the same action by a judge who had previously recused himself was valid
because the moving party could not prove that the unknown prior conflict of
interest had ceased to exist); Diversified Numismatics, Inc. v. City of Orlando, 949
F.2d 382, 385 (1 1th Cir. 1991) ("Prior recusals, without more, do not objectively
demonstrate an appearance of partiality."); United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950,
960 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that "disqualification was not required.., merely
because [the judge] voluntarily withdrew from another case" with the same
defendant as the instant action).
127 See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 534 F.3d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 2008) (applying
"abuse of discretion" to cases where the reasons for recusal were before the district
court and "plain error" where they were not); Andrade v. Chojnacki, 338 F.3d 448,
454 (5th Cir. 2003) (applying an "abuse of discretion" standard in reviewing a
judge's decision not to recuse himself); Higganbotham v. Okla. ex rel. Okla.
Transp. Comm'n, 328 F.3d 638, 645 (10th Cir. 2003) (applying an "abuse of
discretion" standard in reviewing a judge's decision not to recuse himself).
128 See Frost, supra 83, at 567-68 (noting that "parties often lack the factual
information necessary" to seek recusal, and they "will hesitate to ask the judge to
recuse himself on the basis of speculation or gossip"). Such details are important
for parties in future cases because "the mere fact that a judge has recused himself
from one case will not normally mandate his disqualification from other cases of a
similar type which involve different parties and counsel." FLAMM, supra note 3, §
22.9, at 663-64.
2015
204 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LA TREVIEW V
down the road and allow them to take appropriate steps. 121 Putting
the ability to anticipate future issues more squarely in the hands of
parties, who have a very strong monetary interest in an impartial
judiciary in these types of cases, would go a long way toward
ensuring that procedural snafus like the one in Comer are not
repeated.
Disclosure of the reasons for recusal might also allow litigants to
avoid the problem of mass recusal entirely. If, through the use of
recusal memoranda issued in earlier but similar cases, litigants could
demonstrate to a trial court that meaningful appellate review would
be extremely problematic, that could be sufficient to justify a
transfer of venue to a trial court in a different circuit "in the interest
of justice." 130 Depending on the circumstances, such motions may
not even be opposed by corporate defendants. Since judicial ties to
the corporate defendants are likely to trigger most mass recusals,
defendants might reasonably conclude that they would fare better in
another circuit. The judges who remain eligible to sit on three-judge
appellate panels in circuits where a mass recusal is a realistic
possibility not have financial ties to the industries involved in the
litigation because of political or ideological views unsympathetic to
those industries. 131 Thus, for corporate defendants, the prospect of
mass recusal in a circuit increases the odds of an unsympathetic
panel and the odds that panel's decision will stand because an en
banc court would not be able to muster a quorum to grant a
rehearing.
D. Recusals Without Explanation Create Potentially Unsolvable
Due Process Problems
The reasons for requiring recusal memoranda extend not only to
issues of judicial ethics and the appearance of bias, but also to the
life and death of litigation. When a judge who later recuses or
129 See Frost, supra note 82, at 567-69.
130 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012).
131 Curious Case, supra note 66 (pointing out that plaintiffs could game the system
by "add[ing] defendants to the suit for the purposes of targeting judicial recusals
and [obtaining] a more favorable hearing").
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becomes disqualified has taken meaningful action on a case,
questions as to what extent the rights of the party potentially
prejudiced are infringed and what kind of remedy is appropriate
come to the forefront. 132 Obviously, most aggrieved parties would
seek vacatur of unfavorable decisions, and Comer is an excellent
example of how determining whether vacatur is appropriate may
prove to be impossible where a judge has voluntarily recused himself
or herself and issued no statement.
Although the injury to a party potentially prejudiced by an
untimely judicial recusal can rise to constitutionally impermissible
levels, most such determinations will be made under statutory
provisions. 133 Given the Supreme Court's pronouncement in
Caperton v. Massey, we know that judicial recusals are governed by
an objective standard whether the violation is deemed to be
statutory 134 or constitutional. 135 However, as a practical matter,
whether the violation based on an appearance of impropriety is
merely statutory, arising out of § 455(a), or grounded in the Due
Process Clause makes little difference in terms of the remedy that
will be available to the parties. Because the standard to make out a
statutory violation is at least as low, if not lower, than that required
to make out a constitutional violation, and the same top remedy-the
vacatur of prior orders of the disqualified judge-is available for
statutory violations, virtually all cases in federal court will end up
132 See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825, 827-28 (1986)
(disqualifying a judge under the Due Process Clause and then considering the
proper remedy for the injured parties).
133 See id. at 828 ("The Due Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of
judicial disqualifications. Congress and the states, of course, remain free to impose
more rigorous standards for judicial disqualification than those we find mandated
here today.").
134 Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994) (holding that under § 455(a)
'what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance").
135 Capertonv. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 883 (2009) ("[T]he Due
Process Clause has been implemented by objective standards that do not require
proof of actual bias [for non recusal to be a constitutional violation].") (citations
omitted).
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being adjudicated under § 455(a). 136 The upshot is that although
state courts may need to grapple with the standard to be applied in
determining remedies, 137 federal cases will ultimately be determined
by the "harmless error" test set out in Lijeberg v. Health Services
Acquisition Corp. 138 There, the court held:
[I]n determining whether a judgment should be
vacated for a violation of § 455(a), it is appropriate to
consider the risk of injustice to the parties in the
particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will
produce injustice in other cases, and the risk of
undermining the public's confidence in the judicial
139process.
When a judge has not issued a recusal statement, this issue becomes
particularly tricky. First, determining the risk of injustice to the
parties hinges upon what decisions the judge has made, if any, in
violation of his duty to recuse. 140 Second, determining the
magnitude of the risk that denial of relief in the instant case will
produce injustice in other cases must have some focus on the nature
136 See Keith R. Fisher, Selva Oscura: Judicial Campaign Contributions,
Disqualification, and Due Process, 48 DuQ. L. REV. 767, 822 n. 204 (2010)
("While it is possible that an 'extreme case' might someday arise in which denial
by a federal judge of a disqualification motion might implicate the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the existence of [recusal statutes] renders that
prospect remote.") [hereinafter Fisher]; see also Dmitry Barn, Understanding
Caperton: Judicial Disqualification Under the Due Process Clause, 42
MCGEORGE L. REV. 65, 77, 77 n. 83 (2010) (discussing how the Caperton
'probability of bias" standard is in some ways more difficult to apply than §
455(a)'s standard and that § 455(a)'s standard would apply to most judges, and all
federal judges, regardless of the constitutional standard).
137 See Fisher, supra 138, at 821 (commenting that a harmless error standard seems
"inappropriate" in Caperton cases).
13" Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 862, 864 (1988).13 9 Id. at 864.
140 See, e.g., Patterson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 335 F.3d 476, 485-86 (5th Cir. 2003)
(hinging the first prong of the harmless error analysis on a comparison of the
standards of review for the district and appellate courts and finding that because
the standards were the same there was minimal risk of injustice).
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of the conflict in the instant case. 141 Third, accurately assessing the
risk of undermining the public's confidence in the judicial process 142
now requires consideration of whether the means of the recusal itself
affect the public's confidence: i.e., does the judge's choice not to
issue a recusal statement itself have an impact on public confidence
in the courts? Comer well illustrates all of these problems.
Determining exactly when a judge ought to have recused is
necessary to allow the parties to identify which, if any, of the judge's
prior orders are subject to challenge. Knowing the holdings of those
orders is necessary to determine the scope of the potential injury,
which is an essential element of the harmless error analysis.1 3 An
improperly issued order setting the date of a scheduling conference
is unlikely to have resulted in injury to a party; a judgment
dismissing a cause of action is far more likely to have done so.
In Comer, the timing issue is particularly glaring because of the
late recusal. Only nine weeks had passed between the vote to rehear
en banc and the letter to the parties indicating that an additional
judge had recused. 144 Although the court indicated that "new
circumstances" had given rise to the recusal,1 4 5 that statement does
not resolve the critical question of whether the disqualifying conflict
pre-existed the vote to rehear. Whether that vote was properly cast
is critical to determining what the risk of injury was. If the conflict
reaches back to before the vote on rehearing en banc, then the injury
is clear: the failure to timely recuse was outcome-determinative of
the case and the potential injury to the Comer plaintiffs was
141 See id. at 486 (weighing the likelihood that refusing to vacate "post-recusal
orders would create injustice in future cases" as the second step in a harmless error
analysis).
142 See id. (assessing whether "the public's confidence in the judicial process
[would] be undermined" by a finding of harmless error).
143 Lieberg, 486 U.S. at 864.
144 See Docket Sheet, Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, No. 07-60756 (5th Cir. June 18,
2013) (showing the petition granted on Feb. 26, 2010, and notice of recusal nine
weeks later on Apr. 30, 2010).
145 Letter to the Parties Notifying Them of Loss of Quorum and Canceling Oral
Argument, Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, No. 07-60756 (5th Cir. Apr. 30, 2010),
ECF No. 00511097646.
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enormous. 146 Meaning, if Judge Elrod had not participated in the
vote to rehear, the court would not have had a quorum to vote on the
motion for rehearing en banc. And, absent a vote to rehear en banc,
the Comer I panel decision would not have been automatically
vacated pursuant to the Fifth Circuit's local rules. 
147
If the disqualifying conflict existed prior to the vote, the statutory
command for disqualification was in effect prior to the vote to rehear
and the late recusal was harmful error.148 Moreover, even if a §
455(b) conflict did not exist prior to the vote, but circumstances
creating a § 455(a) conflict did, that conflict would be retroactive. 149
However, because Judge Elrod issued no statement, it is impossible
to determine exactly at what point the conflict came into existence
and whether or not her participation in the vote to rehear would be
subject to challenge. Had she issued a recusal memorandum,
particularly one in conformity with the proposed statutory changes
outlined infra, then the Comer plaintiffs would have been able to
make that determination.
Whether denial of a remedy would promote injustice in other
cases is also a question that can go unanswered where a judge
voluntarily recuses without issuing a statement because the nature
and circumstances of the conflict remain hidden. This factor is
primarily concerned with the impact the remedy given will have on
future judicial decision-making. Without disclosure, however, future
courts have no guidance for future recusal decisions or the behavior
146 It is possible that this injury might be considered to be mitigated somewhat
because the Comer plaintiffs would have had a near impossible time of proving
proximate causation. See Comer I, 585 F.3d 855, 880 (5th Cir. 2009) (Davis, J.,
concurring) (stating that he would have upheld the district court on the alternative
ground "that the plaintiffs failed to allege facts" establishing proximate causation
'of the plaintiffs' alleged injuries").
147 See 5th Cir. R. 41.3 available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/docs/default-
source/forms-and-documents---clerks-office/rules/5thcir-iop.pdf.
148 See United States v. Lindsey, 556 F.3d 238, 246-48 (4th Cir. 2009) (vacating
an order issued by ajudge who had a § 455(b) conflict of which he was unaware at
the time the order was issued).
149 See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860-61 (1988)
(stating that § 455(a) may be applied "retroactively," thus requiring the judge "to
rectify an oversight and to take the steps necessary to maintain public confidence
in the impartiality of the judiciary").
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they need to engage in to avoid the creation of § 455(a) conflicts. 150
Normally, a reviewing court could simply weigh the reasons for
which a judge recused and forecast what precedential value the
denial of a remedy in future, similar cases would have. However, in
determining a remedy without a recusal statement to work with, a
court must consider the impact of the existence of the non-statement
in context and can only speculate as to the reasons for recusal; that is
all the court would have to work with. 
151
In Comer, a reviewing court might see a good opportunity to
create clearer recusal rules, potentially alleviating mass and late
recusal problems such as those discussed in supra Subsection C.
But, without knowing the reason for the recusal, a reviewing court
would be incapable of drawing the necessary line. How can a
reviewing court predict the impact of giving a remedy and attempt to
guide future judicial behavior when the exact behavior in question,
other than a silent recusal, is unknown? Simply put, it cannot.
Assessing whether denial of a remedy will injure public
confidence in the recusal process is similarly problematic where no
recusal statement is issued. Here, a court must weigh not only the
issue of leaving the prior decision in place, but now also must
consider the impact of leaving the prior decision in place where the
judge has recused without issuing a reason. As discussed supra in
Subsection A, the lack of an explanation and outcome of Comer
certainly damaged public confidence in the Fifth Circuit. The
determination of such an impact would result in an odd, practical
equivalence of recusals for actual bias and those based on
appearances only. Additionally, although a court can weigh the
appearance created by saying nothing, such a determination must
ultimately be grounded in little more than speculation, and since the
public does not know the reason for the recusal, vacatur of prior
15°See United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764, 777 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that
encouraging different judicial conduct in future trials satisfied the second prong of
Liljeberg); Clemmons v. Wolfe, 377 F.3d 322, 328-29 (3d Cir. 2004) (applying
Liljeberg and expressly exercising "supervisory powers" to "avoid the recurrence"
of the failure to recuse in circumstances before the court).
151 See Frost, supra 83, at 580 (discussing the "[t]he absence of precedents
supporting recusal").
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orders may do little to restore public confidence given the extra time
and expense that the state and the litigants must endure in such a
case. 152 Moreover, a decision granting vacatur where this third
factor is based on the non-issuance of a recusal memorandum may
undermine confidence in the judicial system in and of itself. 153
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR STATUTORY CHANGE TO REQUIRE RECUSAL
MEMORANDA
The problems discussed in the preceding section can be
minimized or avoided by requiring judges who recuse sua sponte to
issue recusal memoranda. This section proposes two statutory
additions and explains why they address the problem in a manner
that is both helpful and respectful of judicial privacy. These two
provisions, one creating a general obligation for disclosure and a
second creating an additional procedure where a conflict could
potentially be waived under § 455(e), are designed to work together
and to impose minimal burdens on the judiciary. The proposal is
that the following should be added as additional subsections to 28
U.S.C. § 455:
(g) Any judge whose disqualification arises under
the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or other
statutory provision shall make a disclosure on
the record which must include, but need not
be limited to, a statement of the following:
(1) the statutory provision or provisions under
which his disqualification arises; and
(2) the date upon which his or her
disqualification first arose.
152 Fisher, supra 138, at 822 n. 204 (arguing that creation of additional process
slows down the judicial system and "diminish[es] public respect for, and
confidence in, our judicial system").
153 See Sarah M. R. Cravens, In Pursuit ofActual Justice, 59 ALA. L. REv. 1, 16 n.
70 (2007) ("The disingenuousness of [an approach focusing on the appearance of
bias rather than actual bias] ultimately only further erodes public confidence in the
judiciary.").
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(h) When any judge is disqualified under
subsection (a) he or she shall, upon the timely
request of the parties, make additional
disclosure on the record of the basis of his or
her disqualification. Such disclosure shall be
sufficiently detailed to permit the parties to
waive the conflict pursuant to subsection (e).
This statutory language, or something similar, would solve or
lessen many of the problems with voluntary judicial recusal without
overburdening the judiciary or unduly invading the privacy of
recusing judges. In essence, the provision requires that minimal
disclosure be made in all cases. The most serious conflicts and those
which potentially impede greatest upon judicial privacy (i.e., those
which arise under § 455(b)) need only be identified to the extent
necessary for a reviewing court to conduct a harmless error analysis.
Those disqualifying circumstances that Congress has determined to
be less serious and therefore waivable, arising under § 455(a), could
require greater disclosure if the parties are contemplating exercising
their waiver option under § 455(e).
Problems resulting from speculation as to the cause for recusal
that are damaging to the reputation of the court, like those that
surrounded the late recusal in Comer, would therefore be
significantly curtailed by proposed subsection (g). By identifying
the date of the disqualifying events and the relevant statutory
provision or provisions, observers will have a more solid idea of the
type of conflict that occurred, legitimizing the propriety of the
recusal, and making plain whether the disqualified judge should have
identified the problem and recused earlier in the process.154
Moreover, because a detailed disclosure is not initially required, the
imposition upon judicial time and privacy is minimal. For example,
the statement "As of January 17, 2011, I was disqualified from this
154 It is true that such disclosure could expose a judge who did not live up to his or
her ethical obligations. Taking away the ability of a judge to cloak his or her prior
wrongdoing in a later recusal, however, hardly seems objectionable. Moreover, as
I have noted earlier, such cases would be very, very rare.
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case under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(iii)" would be sufficient to satisfy
the statute, take mere seconds to pen, and reveal only that the judge,
the judge's spouse, or a closely related person is "known by the
judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding." 155 The problem of retroactivity and
non-disclosure in § 455(a) cases would also be solved; reviewing
courts could craft remedies for late recusal with the full knowledge
of when the disqualification arose.
The provision requiring additional disclosure would furthermore
make the waiver option in § 455(e) meaningful in cases where the
parties may have an interest in keeping the judge presently assigned
to the case. By allowing the parties to demand and receive
additional disclosure where the conflict could be waived, the
provision will empower the parties to affirmatively use the waiver
option.
Finally, although the potential for greater judicial time
expenditure or meaningful invasion of privacy is theoretically
possible under proposed subsection (h), pragmatism argues
otherwise. It is the very rare case where a lawyer would want to
keep a judge when that judge is attempting to recuse. Unless the
timing of the recusal is important and the parties doubt the
disqualified judge's determination of when the conflict arose, parties
who do not earnestly seek to keep a judge on the case would have
little to no reason to demand a more significant statement.
Therefore, the actual increase in judicial work and invasion of
judicial privacy caused by invocations of proposed subsection (h)
would be minimal in practice. 156 Even where a more significant
statement must be issued, given the amount of disclosure that judges
must engage in as a general matter, it seems unlikely that situations
would arise where the conflict stems from some area about which
the judge has not already revealed to the public a substantial amount
of information. 157 Last, although this provision would also apply to
155 28 U.S.C. § 455(B)(5)(iii) (2012).
156 This is particularly true when the proposal here is compared to other proposals
to increase the transparency of judicial recusal. See SAMPLE ET AL., FAIR COURTS:
SETTING JUDICIAL RECUSAL STANDARDS 27-28 (2009) (discussing several other
proposals for increased disclosure).
157 See McKeown Statement, supra note 58, at 6.
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cases where the parties have sought the disqualification of a judge,
minimal disclosure in such cases would present no additional burden
to judges since compliance with the proposed statutory changes
would require no more than an additional line or two in the order
granting the motion they must issue anyway.
Of course, the statutory provisions proposed are not a necessary
prerequisite to judges issuing recusal memoranda. Judges are free
to, and should, issue statements when they voluntarily recuse
themselves from a case in which they have participated without
being compelled to do so by statute. Given that most judges do not
presently issue such memoranda, a statutory provision like the one
outlined above seems advisable.
V. CONCLUSION
Maintaining the credibility of the American judicial system in a
world that is increasingly interconnected both socially and
economically is far too important not to defend vigorously. Comer
illustrated many of the presently unaddressed issues that can arise
with voluntary judicial recusal. That a judicial disqualification can
leave parties in the dark as to why they were denied an appellate
adjudication on the merits is anathema to the healthy and transparent
system of justice the American federal system strives for. The two
proposed statutory provisions discussed could easily be incorporated
into federal law, solve the problems discussed in the context of
Comer, and do so without overburdening the judiciary by requiring
minimal disclosure by federal judges when they find they are
disqualified from a case before them. These, or other similar
solutions, must be seriously considered by policymakers going
forward, lest we risk more cases like Comer.
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